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Notes
ACCEPTANCE BY ACT NOT COMMUNICATED TO
OFFEROR-Ross v. Leberman, 298 Pa. 575, decides not only
that an offeror's promise becomes binding when the act
named as a condition of the promise has been done but
that failure to give the offeror notice that the act has been
done is mere matter of defense and the plaintiff need not
aver that he gave notice. Ross authorized Leberman to
apply money which Leberman owed him to the needs of a
corporation in which they were both interested. When
sued for the sum owed, Leberman set up that he had ap-
plied the money as directed. The lower court held that
Leberman was bound to aver that he had informed Ross
when the actual expenditures were made. Revetsed..
The debt arose in 1921. Authority to apply the money
was given in 1923. Suit was brought in 1928. The outlays
were made between 1923 and 1926. Ross contended that
there was no acceptance of his offer alleged, for Leberman
did not aver notice of acceptance. Obviously, the case was
not one of guaranty but rather a discharge of a debt by
payment to a third person at the request of the creditor.
Was there any burden on the debtor to report the payment
or was the creditor bound to ascertain whether the cor-
poration had received the money? The authority was con-
tingent upon the payment of a like sum by the debtor on
his own account for the benefit of the corporation in which
both parties were interested. Was there a duty to report
that this condition had been performed or was the creditor
bound to ascertain from the corporation all that happened?
Ross did not request reports from Lebertnan as to what
he did in the matter and any duty to report arose by opera-
tion of law, either as an essential part of the law of con-
tracts relating to the acceptance of an offer or as part of
the duty of an agent to keep his principal informed as to
what he does for his benefit. The Supreme Court treated
the case as the acceptance of an offer to make a unilateral
contract, rather than as a case of agency, perhaps for the
reason that the act authorized was for the mutual benefit of
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both parties and not solely for the benefit of the one au-
thorizing it.
The offer or authority, whichever it was, remained un-
revoked until it had been acted upon. Whether it might
have lapsed before it was acted upon is not discussed by
the court.
"As a one-fourth owner of the stock of the corporation
it would seem he was in position to secure the information
if desired". * * * * "It is not the notice which creates the
contract, but the lack of it may constitute an excuse from
liability. If this is so, then the agreement is enforceable,
unless the promisor can establish that for some reason he is
relieved from performance. If this arises from failure to
give notice at the time advances were made, and he was
therefore misled and prejudiced, not having the power to
learn the true facts by inquiry, this is a matter of defense,
and must be averred in answer to the counterclaim filed,
which is on its face sufficient".(p. 581)
In Bishop v. Eaton,1 the court said: "The language relied
relied on was an offer to guarantee, which the plaintiff
might or might not accept. Without acceptance of it there
was no contract, because the offer was conditional and
there was no consideration for the promise. But this was
not a proposition which was to become a contract only upon
the giving of a promise for a promise, and it was not neces-
sary that the plaintiff should accept it in words, or promise
to do anything before acting upon it. It was an offer
which was to become effective as a contract upon the doing
of the act referred to. It was an offer to be bound in con-
sideration of an ict to be done, and in such a case the
doing of the act constitutes the acceptance of the offer and
furnishes the consideration. Ordinarily there is no occasion
to notify the offeror of the acceptance of such an offer, for
the doing of the act is a sufficient acceptance, and the
promisor knows that he is bound when he sees that action
has been taken on the faith of his offer. But if the act is of
such a kind that knowledge of it will not quickly come to the
1161 Mass. 496. (1894).
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pronisor, the promisee is bound to give him notice of his ac-
ceptance within a reasonable time after doing that which con-
stitutes the acceptance. In such a case it is implied in the
offer that, to complete the contrt.ct, notice shall be given
with due diligence, so that the promisor may know that a
contract has been made. But where the promise is in con-
sideration of an act to be done, it becomes binding upon
the doing of the act so far that the promisee cannot be
affected by a subsequent withdrawal of it, if within a
reasonable time afterwards he notifies the promisor".
In Bishop v. Eaton, the guarantor wrote the plaintiff:
"If Harry needs more money, let him have it or assist him
to get it, and I will see that it is paid". The offeree made
no promise to do as requested but proceeded to do so.
Such a situation is distinguished from that in Ross v. Leber-
man by the fact that when Ross authorized the use of his
money for corporate purposes, it was in conversation With
Leberman and Justice Sadler says: "The offer was con-
temporaneous with the understanding that advances were
to be made". Whether it is meant that a binding contract
was then made by these two parties to make equal ad-
vances to their corporation, is not clear. He may mean only
that Ross had more ground to expect action in reliance
upon the promise than had the offeror in Bishop v. Eaton.
A like expectation is aroused by the fact that a guaranty
is offered in response to a request by the guarantee. But in
Evans v. McCormick,2 the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court were rejected and it was held that precedent
request cannot supply the place of subsequent notice, the
purpose of which is to- inform the guarantor that -the ad-
vance has actually been made. It would seem that a mere
"understanding" would be open to the same objection. It
is the fact that the advance has been made that the offeror
is entitled to know. But the Court intimates that this
"understanding" produced a situation similar to that of
"an absolute guaranty accepted when given", as in Gardner
2167 Pa. 247. (1895).
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v. Lloyd.'
This decision is interesting as showing again the dis-
position of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, to give
careful consideration to the pronouncements of the Ameri-
can Law Institute. The court quotes section 56 of the Re-
statement of the Law of Contracts." Of course when the
offer is to pay for services to be rendered to the offeror
personally, their rendition is acceptance and words are
superfluous. 5 The same is true when the act showing
assent is a course of dealing between the offeror and of-
feree. 6 But when the promisor requests a dealing with a
third person, as when one offers to guarantee payment, if
the offeree will sell goods to another, the offeror is not
in position to infer acceptance from what he must see, if
3l10 Pa. 278, 284. (1885). See also Black, Starr & Frost v. Grabow,
216 Mass. 516, 518 (1914) as to "some previous understanding" as re-
lieving of the duty to give notice in guaranty cases.
4"Where forebearance or an act other than a promise is the con-
sideration for a promise, no notification that the act or forebearance
has been given is necessary to complete the contract. But if the
offeror has no adequate means of ascertaining with reasonable
promptness and certainty that the act or forebearance has been given,
and the offeree should know this, the contract is discharged unless
within a reasonable time after performance of the act or forebear-
ance, the offeree exercises reasonable diligence to notify the offeror
thereof". Comment: "It is only in the exceptional case where the
offeror has no convenient means of ascertaining whether the re-
quested act has been done that notice is requisite. Even then, it is
not the notice which creates -the contract, but lack of the notice
which ends the duty".
5Snyder v. McGill, 265 Pa. 122. (1919); Nangle's Est., 268 Pa.
481. (1920).
6Lineweaver's Est., 284 Pa. 384, 391 (1925). In Hoffman v. R. R.,
157 Pa. 174, 193 (1893) it is said: "The company began to work upon
the right of way through his farm and made considerable expenditure
of money. It is plain that such work being done in a substantial
performance of the contract, was as well defined a notice of accept-
ance as one clearly expressed in writing, and is sustained by the
rule of the common law 'that the fulfillment of that which the
promisor stipulates for has always been deemed the best and suffi-
cient proof of assent, and notice need not be given unless the circum-
stances are such that he cannot inform himself by inquiry'. Hare on
Contracts; 313".
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he does not shut his eyes. It would seem that it is for this
reason that notice has always been required in such cases
in Pennsylvania.7
Justice Sadler quotees with approval from Hare on
Contracts, page 332: "When, what the promisor stipulates
for is performance, the contract is complete as soon as the
act is done, whether it be or be not known or communicated
to the promisor. If the circumstances are such that he
cannot inform himself by inquiry, it may be requisite to give
him notice; but this is a condition subsequent that will
annul the contract if unfulfilled, and not a step that must
be taken to call it into being".
Contrast with this the American Law Institute's propo-
sition that the contract "is discharged" whenever the offeror
has "no adequate means of ascertaining with reasonable
promptness and certainty that the act or forbearance has been
done, and the offeree should know this", etc.
The American Law Institute has attempted a general-
ization applicable to all offers to make unilateral contracts,
with the guaranty cases as its basis. The opinion in Ross v.
Leberman indicates that the guaranty cases are to be deemed
a class apart and that the other cases in which one must
report the doing of an act which constitutes acceptance are
quite exceptional. "If Ross was deceived as to the extent
of payments being made, or he was unable, after due in-
TIn Sullivan Smythfield Co. v. Welsh, 91 Pa. Super. Ct. 413. (1926)
it is said: "The reason for requiring notice is to enable the guarantor
to know the nature and extent of his liability, so that he may guard
himself against losses and reasonable notice after the sale has actually
been made is all that is necessary". This seems to be the first clear
statement that notice in these cases is a condition subsequent. The
contrary was indicated in Acme Mfg. Co. v. Reed, 197 Pa. 359, 365.
(1900) in Justice Brown's words: "Upon the making of the contract
and notice of the acceptance of the guaranty by the company for the
fulfillment by Schlandecker, and not before, the guarantor would
incur liability". That this statement was construed as making the
notice a condition precedent in guaranty cases, see "Offer of Guar-
anty, its Acceptance and Notice Thereof", XXVII Dickinson Law
Review 183 at 189, (1923). Curiously the Acme Mfg. Co. case is
cited in the Sullivan Smythfield Co. case as sustaining the proposition
that notice is only a condition subsequent.
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quiry, though owning one-fourth of the stock of the com-
pany, to find the amount being expended under his agree-
ment, this may be considered in way of defense, but if he
desires to take advantage of such facts, he must assert
and prove them".
In Harriman on Contracts, (2d ed.) see. 149, page 84,
referring to communication of acceptance of guaranties,
it is said: "Failure to give notice is therefore a condition
subsequent, putting an end to the contract; yet the ano-
malous rule has been laid down by the highest authority
that the guarantee is bound to prove that he has given
notice. (Douglass v. Reynolds, 7 Pet. 113.) Logically, of
course, it should be for the guarantor to show that he has
received no notice, and is therefore discharged from the
obligation which comes into existence as soon as the ad-
vances are made by the guarantee".
In Davis v. Wells, 104 U. S. 159, 164, it is said that the
requirement of notice of acceptance of an offer of guaranty
is an instance of the rule "entering in the very nature and
definition of every contract, which requires the assent of a
party to whom a proposal is made to be signified to the
party making it, in order to constitute a binding promise".
Harriman, in see. 147, says that this "has been repeated
so often that, if repetition could make the law, such a rule
might have been established".
The instant decision is in line with the best modern
thought on the subject. The drift is away from requiring
notice even in the guaranty cases9 but the rule in these
cases is probably too firmly established in Pennsylvania to
be abandoned.
J. P. McKeehan
*ARl italics in this note are the author's.
'Midland Bank v. Security Elevator Co., 161 Minn. 30, 200 N. W.
851. (1924).
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